somewhat differently. 3 In some of the Nordic countries, there is also an opening to isolate and detain a person with a disease dangerous to society. In this case, as well, the criteria for isolation must be strict, and detention must be used as a last resort, in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. This is demonstrated by the Enhorn case, where the Swedish authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the need to ensure that the HN virus did not spread and the applicant's right to liberty.4
In 1994, it was discovered that Enhorn, who is a homosexual, was infected with the HN virus. In response, the county medical officer issued instructions to the applicant constraining his conduct in order to prevent him from spreading the HN infection. When the authorities were alerted to the fact that the applicant was not complying with these instructions, and had transmitted the virus to a 19-year old man, the County Administrative Court ordered that the applicant be compulsorily isolated for up to three months pursuant to Section 38 of the 1988 Infectious Diseases Act. A psychiatric report on the applicant noted that he "suffered from a paranoid personality disorder and from alcohol abuse. He was considered to be completely void of a sense of being ill and also lacked awareness. The combination of a sexual orientation towards younger men and a possible alcohol related neuro-psychological functional impairment, from the infectionspreading viewpoint, was deemed disadvantageous." As a result of the confinement order, the applicant was in total isolation for approximately one and a half years.
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged having "only to a very limited extent ruled on cases where a person has been detained in order to prevent the spreading of infectious diseases': Therefore, it established new criteria to assess whether or not a detention was lawful, asserting that a detention is lawful where the spread of the disease is dangerous to public health and safety, and where that detention is used as a last resort. According to the Court, these criteria ensure that the law complies with the principle of proportionality and is free from arbitrariness. In this case, the Court held that HN does indeed constitute a danger to public health. However, the Court also said that it was not possible to conclude that the repeated confinement orders were employed "as a last resort" because the Swedish government had not proVided "any examples ofless severe measures which might have been considered for the applicant during the period 16 February 1995 to 12 December 2001, but were apparently found to be insufficient as regards safeguarding the public interest': In addition, the overall duration of the confinement orders showed that "the authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the need to ensure that the HN virus did not spread and the applicant's right to liberty':
